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Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1991
DouGLAss G. BosmHoPF*
During the period covered by this survey,' the Seventh Circuit decided
more than fifty bankruptcy appeals. I have included only opinions of
more than passing interest in this review of the court's work, including
one district court opinion which treats matters of particular interest to
Indiana bankruptcy practitioners.
I. PowERs OF AvoIDANcE
Two separate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code authorize avoidance
of fraudulent transfers. Section 544(b) vests the trustee with rights created
by state law in favor of creditors holding unsecured claims. 2 Section
548 is a federal fraudulent conveyance statute which is only available
to the bankruptcy trustee.3 In Jones v. Atchison,4 the Seventh Circuit
held that a debtor's pre-bankruptcy renunciation of a testamentary gift
cannot be set aside under section 548. 5 Neither the trial judge nor the
appellate court addressed the merits. Arguably, renunciation by an in-
solvent heir is a fraud on creditors. 6 Each court in the Atchison case
decided, however, that the relation back effect of the disclaimer ret-
roactively eliminated the transfer and eliminated any need to discuss
possible prejudice to creditors.7
The renunciation in Atchison occurred less than three months before
the debtor's bankruptcy and was initially challenged under both section
544(b) and section 548. The bankruptcy judge decided that state law
failed to create any cause of action which could be passed along to the
trustee via section 544(b).8 This interpretation of state law was clearly
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington.
I am grateful for the helpful comments of my colleague, Bruce Markell and the research
assistance of Michael A. Slaney, Class of 1992.
1. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1989-1990, 24
IND. L. REv. 551 (1991) (covering a period which concluded on August 31, 1990). This
survey covers cases decided during the balance of 1990 and all of 1991. Cases decided
during 1991 are included only if the opinions appeared in the West advance sheets on
or before December 30, 1991 (947 F.2d No. 3).
2. I1 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
4. In re Atchison, 925 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178 (1991).
5. Id. at 212.
6. See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CoRuNEU L. REv.
587, 610-26 (1989).
7. Atchison, 925 F.2d at 211-12.
8. Jones v. Atchison (In re Atchison), 101 B.R. 556, 557 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
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correct. The Illinois Probate Act does not allow creditors of a disclaiming
party to challenge the renunciation absent special circumstances not
present in the facts of this case. 9 This part of the lower court's ruling
was not challenged on appeal.10 Only the section 548 claim came before
the Seventh Circuit.
In affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court, Judge Will offered
an unsatisfactory justification for dismissing the challenge based solely
upon federal law. He reasoned that because a valid disclaimer had the
effect of preventing the debtor from acquiring any interest in the dis-
claimed property, the debtor never had any interest in property which
could be the subject of a transfer. After the disclaimer, no transfer
had occurred because there was nothing to transfer. Thus, there was
nothing which could be avoided under section 548. Such circular reasoning
is often encountered in litigation involving disclaimers of testamentary
gifts.' 2 The retroactive effect of a disclaimer is offered as the justification
for concluding that no transfer exists. Once one assumes that no transfer
exists, the validity of the disclaimer which produces the retroactive effect
is assumed and cannot be debated.
Judge Will reasoned that Illinois law controlled the interpretation
of section 548. Relying on Butner v. United States3 he observed, "Absent
a federal provision to the contrary, a debtor's interest in property is
determined by applicable state law.' 14 No one doubts that Illinois is
free to fashion its laws of testate and intestate succession in a way that
prejudices the interests of the disclaimant's creditors, but the Illinois
choice is not necessarily one which should control the interpretation of
section 548. A line of cases beginning with Durrett v. Washington
National Insurance Co.' has held that section 548, as federal law, can
be used to avoid a transfer which is beyond the reach of nonbankruptcy
fraudulent conveyance law. The Seventh Circuit has endorsed the general
principle announced in Durrett.'6 Thus, the exercise of a power of
disclaimer could be viewed as a transfer under section 101(50)17 of the
9. Id.
10. In re Atchison, 925 F.2d 209, 210 n.2 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178
(1991).
11. Id. at 211.
12. See Hirsch, supra note 6, at 593-95, 601.
13. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
14. Atchison, 925 F.2d at 210.
15. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
16. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 822-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (mortgage
foreclosure in compliance with state law may be avoided under § 548). This and similar
applications of § 548 are criticized in THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LouIc AND Lnrrs OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 148-50 (1986).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (Supp. I 1990).
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Code, regardless of the Illinois view. The appropriate relationship between
the law of testate and intestate succession and the law of fraudulent
conveyances is not well articulated in judicial decisions. There are good
arguments for both favoring and opposing the application of fraudulent
transfer concepts to testamentary disclaimers.' This problem deserved
a more extensive and thoughtful consideration than was received in the
Atchison opinion. 19
Finally, and this may be the most disturbing aspect of this case,
the Seventh Circuit failed to acknowledge and discuss cases, including
one bankruptcy decision from the Central District of Illinois, 20 which
conclude that post-petition disclaimers of inheritance violate section 549.21
If the relation back doctrine fals to negate the existence of a transfer
when section 549 is invoked, why not apply the same analysis to pre-
petition disclaimers? Further confusing the situation is the fact that in
another disclaimer case, out of the Southern District of Illinois, the
trustee was successful in avoiding a disclaimer under section 549. 2
Atchison is cited and distinguished. 2 Sooner or later, the Seventh Circuit
will be forced to clarify its position on disclaimers.
II. CLAIMS
Equitable considerations continue to play a prominent role in the
Seventh Circuit's disposition of claim disputes.24 This year the court, in
18. See Hirsch, supra note 6, at 610-26.
19. Two cases condemning prebankruptcy disclaimers were dismissed in one sentence
in Atchison: "Cases cited by the trustee to the contrary are unpersuasive because they
fail to give full application to the relation back doctrine under applicable state laws." In
re Atchison, 925 F.2d 209, 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178 (1991).
20. Geekie V. Watson (In re Watson), 65 B.R. 9, 12 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986).
21. Cornelius v. Cornell (In re Cornell), 95 B.R. 219, 222 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1989); McGraw v. Betz (In re Betz), 84 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Flanigan
v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 45 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
22. Williams v. Chenoweth (In re Chenoweth), 132 B.R. 161, 166 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1991).
23. Id. at 164. Judge Meyers, who decided Chenoweth, also wrote the lower court
opinion in Atchison. In Chenoweth, he relied on the reasoning contained in his opinion
in Atchison to justify a different result when the disclaimer occurs post-petition. "The
'entitled to acquire' language of § 541(a)(5)(A) results in a much broader definition of
property of the estate for testamentary interests arising after bankruptcy and manifests
Congress' intent to capture such interests for ... the bankruptcy estate. As such §
541(a)(5)(A) overrides the applicable state law of disclaimer...." Id. This attempt to
articulate a distinction between § 548 litigation and § 549 litigation was unpersuasive when
he authored his opinion in Atchison and remains so in Chenoweth. The relation back
theory of the Seventh Circuit involves an interpretation of "transfer" as that term is
defined in § 101(50). The term is common to both § 548 and § 549. Judge Meyers's
reasoning ignores the Atchison rationale that whatever the debtor owned retroactively
disappeared when the disclaimer took place.
24. There were three equitable subordination decisions last year. See Boshkoff,
supra note 1, at 556-60.
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In re Unroe,25 relied heavily on section 105 to excuse several mistakes
made by the IRS with reference to a tax claim in a Chapter 13 pro-
ceeding. 26
Unroe's Statement of Affairs and Plan indicated total priority tax
debts of $15,000 for the 1982 and 1983 tax years. However, the IRS's
proof of claim, filed before the bar date, covered only 1982 taxes. After
the bar date, the IRS filed a second proof of claim for 1985 taxes which
it styled as an amendment to the previous claim for 1982 taxes. It made
no attempt to obtain an extension of the time for filing as authorized
by Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(1). Almost one year later, it filed a third
proof of claim (the second tardy filing), changing the date in the second
proof of claim (the first tardy filing) to 1983. The debtor's objections
to the late filed claim were rejected by the bankruptcy court on two
grounds either: (1) the late filed claim for 1983 (1985) taxes related back
to the timely proof of claim for 1982 taxes pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c)27 or (2) the bankruptcy court was vested with
an equitable power to accept the late claim. 21
Partially agreeing with this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 29
It first rejected the relation back justification. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c) was not adequate to rescue the late claim because there
was no nexus between the two claims. 0 "Separate years imply separate
tax claims .. ."I Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court's acceptance of the
late claim was an appropriate exercise of the equitable power conferred
by section 105.32
25. 937 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1991).
26. Id. at 349-50.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (relation back of amendments) is applicable in adversary
proceedings and contested matters. See BANK. R. 7015, 9014. A disputed claim is in the
latter category. Unroe, 937 F.2d at 349.
28. Unroe, 937 F.2d at 348.
29. Id. at 351.
30. FED. R. Crv. P. 15(c) permits relation back when the amendment relates to
the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence."
31. In re Unroe, 937 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 349-51. Collier notes two interpretative approaches, narrow and broad,
to § 105. 2 WriLXM M. COLiER, COLLmR ON BANKRurrcy 105.01[3] (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. 1991). Unroe clearly fits in the latter category. Collier describes the
approaches as follows:
The cases and commentary reflect two general schools of thought regarding
the breadth of section 105. The first recognizes that certain goals of the Bank-
ruptcy Code are implied but not stated in the statutory language and views
section 105 as granting the bankruptcy courts authority to fill the gaps left by
the statutory language. The other approach is that section 105 is not a broad
writ, and should be narrowly construed.
Regardless of the view adopted, it should be universally recognized that
[Vol. 25:981
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This result is somewhat surprising in light of prior Seventh Circuit
authority. In Wilkens v. Simon Brothers, Inc., 33 the court refused to
excuse a late filing . 4 However, the Unroe court seized on language in
Wilkens to justify the result it reached. Wilkens had suggested that an
exception to the strict enforcement of time limits could be made if the
late claim was regarded as an amendment of an earlier and timely
informal claim.3s The Unroe court reasoned that the timely filed 1982
claim was fair warning of the IRS's intent to present claims covering
subsequent tax years and warranted the exercise of equitable discretion.3 6
This reasoning is rather curious when one remembers that the court had
previously found no nexus between the timely and late filings for purposes
of relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Unroe raises more questions than it answers. Consider the following
possible lines of inquiry:
1. The IRS claim was allowed even though the agency offered
absolutely no explanation for its late filing. The Wilkens court, on the
other hand, refused to excuse a late filing even though there was a
plausible explanation for the delay-a mix-up which occurred during the
relocation of the creditor counsel's office.37 Arguably, Wilkens presents
a more sympathetic case for relief. Are we to assume that the delinquent
creditor is better off with silence than an admission of fault? How can
a court determine that the delinquent creditor is entitled to equitable
relief when it does not understand how the mix-up occurred?
2. Are governmental creditors more likely to benefit from exercise
of the bankruptcy court's inherent power than nongovernmental claim-
ants? Possibly. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(1) permits an extension of the
time for filing claims by governmental units. Relating that rule to late
claims, the Unroe court observed that "a bankruptcy court's power to
extend the bar date implies a corresponding power to permit late claims." '38
3. What is to be made of the Unroe court's following observation
concerning completely new claims? "We leave for another case the
the power granted to the bankruptcy courts under section 105 is not limitless
and should not be employed as a panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy
case. Section 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit
mandates of other sections of the Bankruptcy Code or mandates of other state
and federal statutes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
33. 731 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 464.
35. Id. The Wilkens case was remanded for further findings as to whether the
creditor's conduct was sufficient "to constitute a de facto informal filing." Id. at 465.
36. In re Unroe, 937 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1991).
37. Wilkens, 731 F.2d at 464.
38. Unroe, 937 F.2d at 350.
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question whether a judge in equity could permit an entirely new claim
filed out of time. Wilkens appears to rule out this possibility, but we
have not had the benefit of briefs or argument on the issue." 3 9 This
quotation suggests a sympathy with further exercise of the bankruptcy
court's power to grant equitable relief. Clearly, the decision in Unroe
invites tardy claimants to petition for relief from the time constraints
contained in Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c).
Unroe is not the only unusual claim decision. The IRS won a second
questionable victory in litigation arising out of serial Chapter 11 filings.
Two years ago, the Seventh Circuit, in Fruehauf Corp. v. Jartran, Inc.,40
decided that Chapter 22 bankruptcies41 were permissible42 and then went
on to hold that an administrative claim arising during the initial filing
did not automatically retain that status in the second Chapter 11 case.43
The court stated, "To receive an administrative priority in Jartran I,
Fruehauf must demonstrate its claims relative to Jartran II; an admin-
istrative priority in Jartran I does not translate to an administrative
priority in Jartran II. '44
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors of White Farm Equipment Co.,41 refused to treat priority tax
claims in the same fashion that Jartran had treated priority administrative
claims. The plan in the initial bankruptcy provided for payment of
priority tax claims over a six year period as required by section
1129(a)(9)(c). 46 When the second Chapter 11 case was filed, the creditor's
committee argued that the tax claim was no longer entitled to priority
status. Relying on the language of section 1141(d), the committee asserted
that the treatment provided in the confirmed plan had been substituted
for the original priority claim. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating:
By this reasoning, all debts incorporated in the reorganization
plan lose their old priority status and are instead transformed
into mere contractual obligations .... As the Committee con-
cedes, administrative claims are intimately tied to a single bank-
39. Id.
40. In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989).
41. A "Chapter 22" bankruptcy is two successive Chapter 11 proceedings. Recently,
the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (1991), refused
to prohibit serial filings absent a finding of bad faith. Johnson was a Chapter 2.0 (7 +
13) proceeding.
42. Jartran, 886 F.2d at 866-67.
43. Id. at 870-71.
44. Id. at 870.
45. 943 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3481 (U.S. Mar. 9,
1992).
46. Id. at 754.
[Vol. 25:981
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ruptcy estate in a manner that is completely different from the
trust fund tax claims at issue here. Absent a clear signal from
Congress, therefore, we are reluctant to adopt the Committee's
broad reading of Jartran and extend its holding so far beyond
its unique facts. 47
Perhaps the decision in White Farm simply reflects some newly
discovered doubts about the wisdom of permitting Chapter 22 cases and
is an attempt to restrict the application of the Jartran decision. In any
event, priority claimants are now in an enviable position, as they may
choose either to continue with the treatment provided by the plan or
revert to their original status. 41 Other parties to the confirmed plan are
not so fortunate. Absent modification or revocation of the plan, they
remain bound to the treatment provided in the original plan of reor-
ganization, even though their affirmative votes may have been influenced
by the treatment of the priority claimants.
III. PROCEDURE
Matters of procedure continue to be a major concern of appellate
courts. The Seventh Circuit is no exception. Although some procedural
wrangling should be expected under even the best of circumstances,
bankruptcy procedural disputes often appear to be unnecessary and
wasteful. Some of the complexity encountered in bankruptcy litigation
can be blamed on congressional unwillingness to create a simple court
structure following the decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.49 A second complicating factor is the division
of adjudicatory responsibility in bankruptcy matters between state and
federal forums, a division which long predated Marathon.5 0 Diamond
Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar' demonstrates how both these complicating
factors can interact in the context of a procedural question often en-
countered by first year law students: Is the forum entitled to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant?
47. Id. at 757.
48. The White Farm court held that the IRS could claim a priority status in the
second bankruptcy only if it was still, as an original matter, entitled to priority at that
time. Id.
49. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Section 1471 of the Bankruptcy Act, which grants jurisdiction
to bankruptcy judges, violates Article III of the Constitution because judicial power of
the United States must be exercised by judges with life tenure and protection against
salary diminution.).
50. STEPHEN E. SNYDER & LAWRANCE PONOROFF, COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LIT-
IoATION § 2.01 (1991).
51. 913 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 968 (1991).
1992]
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Diamond Mortgage was a malpractice action brought by a Chapter
11 debtor in possession against its former attorneys. The plaintiff, whose
bankruptcy was pending in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, commenced this action in the district court for the
same district and claimed that personal jurisdiction over the defendants
was obtained by service of process in Michigan pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d), which authorizes nationwide service of process. The district
court accepted the magistrate's recommendation for dismissal of the
litigation on the ground that Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) was not applicable
to this controversy.
The Seventh Circuit reversed.52 It first decided that the malpractice
was related to the bankruptcy because its resolution would affect the
pool of assets available for distribution to creditors.-3 Having identified
a nexus with bankruptcy, the court then decided that the bankruptcy
rules, including the provision for nationwide service of process, applied
irrespective of the decisionmaker.54 Thus, the fact that the malpractice
action had not been referred to the bankruptcy judge 5 a possible post-
Marathon disposition, had no effect on the applicability of the bankruptcy
rules. This result is quite sensible.
It would seem anomalous to limit nationwide service of
process to only those adversary proceedings which are heard in
the bankruptcy court. To do so would cause personal jurisdiction
to hinge upon whether the district court has withdrawn its
reference to the bankruptcy court. Such a limitation would give
the plaintiff in an adversary case before a bankruptcy court a
more extensive ability to serve defendants than a plaintiff in an
identical adversary case before the district court. This result
hardly seems justifiable. 6
It was then necessary to determine whether Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d)
is constitutional when applied in a non-core (state law) proceeding to
nonresident defendants. Judge Cudahy was satisfied that the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington17 was satisfied by
52. Id. at 1248.
53. Id. at 1239.
54. Id. at 1241.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988) ("Each district court may provide that ... any
or all proceedings ... arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to
the bankruptcy judges for district.").
56. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 968 (1991) (quoting Stavriotis v. Litwin, No. 86-C2328, 1986 WL
12005, at *3 (N.D. Il. Oct. 19, 1986)).
57. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 25:981
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the defendants' contacts with the United States, not with Illinois. 58
We believe ... that the [defendants'] contacts with the State
of Illinois are, for our purposes, simply irrelevant.... Since
section 1334 provides federal question jurisdiction, the sovereign
exercising its authority over the [defendants] is the United States,
not the State of Illinois. Hence, whether there exist sufficient
minimum contacts between the [defendants] and the State of
Illinois has no bearing upon whether the United States may
exercise its power ... pursuant to its federal question jurisdic-
tion. Certainly, the [defendants] have sufficient contacts with
the United States to be subject to the district court's in personam
jurisdiction. 59
Some commentators have questioned the adequacy of this analysis. s0
At the same time, one should note that the result in Diamond Mortgage
is consistent with the approach taken in both the Fourth6' and Eleventh
Circuits.62
The awkwardness of the post-Marathon approach to bankruptcy
adjudication is also reflected in litigation concerning the right to a jury
trial.63 In N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan),64 the debtor tem-
porarily frustrated his former employee's attempt to collect damages for
breach of a covenant not to compete by commencing a voluntary bank-
ruptcy and thus obtaining the benefit of the automatic stay. The employer
responded by commencing an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy
judge claiming that the damages arising from the wrongful competition
were excepted from discharge by section 523(a)(6).65 The bankruptcy
judge agreed and entered a judgment against the debtor for more than
58. Diamond Mortgage, 913 F.2d at 1244.
59. Id.
60. Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Perils of Nationwide Service of Process in a Bankruptcy
Context, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. RE v. 1199, 1210-54 (1991); Daniel N. Gregoire, Note, Fifth
Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U. L. REy.
403 (1981); Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HAxv. L. REv.
703, 713-20 (1982).
61. Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc. (In re Hogue), 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984).
62. Nordberg v. Granfinanciera (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341
(11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
63. An extraordinary amount has been written on this subject. A good statement
of the current situation can be found in S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core
Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain Authority, 65 Am. BAKRc. L.J. 143, 145-
50 (1991). See also SNDER & PONOROrs, supra note 50, 3.05[1].
64. 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(b) (1988) (no discharge "for willful and malicious injury
by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity").
1992]
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$250,000.66 On appeal, the debtor unsuccessfully argued that the bank-
ruptcy judge erred in denying his demand for a jury trial. The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that there was no constitutional right to a trial by
jury.67 First, the dischargeability litigation was equitable in nature and,
as such, involved no right to a jury trial.6 The court then offered a
novel alternative justification for the absence of a jury trial:
Even if we were to assume that the dischargeability action
was legal in nature, however, Hallahan cannot claim a right to
jury trial because, as a Chapter 7 debtor, he voluntarily submitted
his case to bankruptcy court .... [I]f creditors [by filing claims]
... thereby [lose] any jury trial right otherwise guaranteed by
the Seventh Amendment, debtors who initially choose to invoke
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to seek protection from their
creditors cannot be endowed with any stronger right. A defendant
or potential defendant to an action at law cannot initiate bank-
ruptcy proceedings, thus forcing creditors to come to bankruptcy
court to collect their claims, and simultaneously complain that
the bankruptcy forum denies him or her a jury trial.69
The Fifth Circuit recently approved of the result achieved in Hal-
lahan, while criticizing the above broad language:
We agree with the result in Hallahan, but not its reasoning
with regard to why the debtor had no right to a jury trial, even
if the claims against him were legal in nature. As we see it, the
debtor was not entitled to a jury trial in Hallahan, not because
the debtor had filed a petition in bankruptcy, but because the
plaintiff had submitted his claim against the debtor to the eq-
uitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Filing a proof of
claim denied both the plaintiff and the defendant, debtor, any
right to jury trial that they otherwise might have had on that
66. The bankruptcy court held that the wilful breach of a contract was excepted
from discharge by § 523(a)(6). On appeal, debtor conceded that the breach was wilful,
but he did not argue that § 523(a)(6) is inapplicable to contract liability. This was an
apparently unwise strategy in light of current authority. See Friendly Fin. Serv. Mid-City,
Inc. v. Modicue (In re Modicue), 926 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Section 523(a)(6)
is based on tort principles rather than contract"); Palazzolo v. Colclazier (In re Colclazier),
134 B.R. 29 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1991); Dorr & Assocs. v. Pasek (In re Pasek), 129 B.R.
247, 252 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991) (intentional breach of contract alone is insufficient to
establish a willful and malicious purpose within the meaning of § 523(a)(6); 3 WILLAM
M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy 523.16 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1991).
67. Hallahan, 936 F.2d at 1505.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
[Vol. 25:981
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claim. Debtor's petition in bankruptcy could have no legal effect
on plaintiff's claim other than to stay it.70
In addition to the current attention paid to the jury trial issue, the
effect of prior adjudication is becoming a popular topic. For example,
one of the most interesting cases decided during the last survey period,
Barnett v. Stern,7 involved the application of claim preclusion principles
to bankruptcy litigation. The objective of claim preclusion (res judicata)
is to achieve finality in litigation by preventing a party from asserting
a claim that it could have presented, but did not, in a prior proceeding
between the same parties. The related doctrine of issue preclusion (col-
lateral estoppel) prevents relitigation of a fact established in a prior
proceeding between the same parties. Claim preclusion reduces the cost
of litigation by forcing the combination of closely related claims in a
single lawsuit. Issue preclusion does not compel litigation of a factual
issue, but seeks to prevent the same issue from being litigated twice.
The Seventh Circuit, in La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria Modelo,
S.A. de C. V.,72 discussed the application of both principles to litigation
occurring during and after a bankruptcy proceeding. In 1976, the debtor-
to-be (Corona) licensed plaintiff to distribute Corona beer. This agreement
was allegedly terminated in 1982. The following year Corona entered
into a similar arrangement with the defendant. Corona's bankruptcy
followed in 1984. Plaintiff then filed a proof of claim asserting that
Corona's attempt to terminate the contract in 1982 and its subsequent
agreement with the defendant were wrongful. Thereafter, the bankruptcy
court approved the sale of the Corona trademark to defendant "free
and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances." Plaintiff did not
appeal the order of sale, but claimed that it was reserving its right to
sue the defendant. Eight months later, the plaintiff entered into a consent
judgment, withdrawing its claim and acknowledging that Corona's 1982
termination of the 1976 agreement was proper. Following the conclusion
of the bankruptcy, plaintiff brought an action against defendant seeking
a declaration that its 1976 agreement with Corona was enforceable against
the defendant.
The defendant first argued that the plaintiff's consent judgment with
the debtor contained a finding that the 1976 agreement was terminated
in 1982 and prevented any further litigation concerning the continuing
70. In re Jensen, 946 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1991).
71. 909 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1990). This decision is discussed in Boshkoff, supra
note I, at 563-67. For a further discussion, see Douglass G. Boshkoff, Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel in the Post-Northern Pipeline Era, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb.
1992, at 5.
72. 914 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1990).
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validity of the 1976 arrangement. The Seventh Circuit rejected this
analysis. Under the rule of Klingman v. Levinson, 3 a consent judgment
can be given collateral estoppel effect.74 It was not given such effect in
this instance because the consent judgment was ambiguous and did not
clearly indicate an intent to bar the subsequent litigation against the
defendant.7 5 However, the doctrine of res judicata was applicable. 76 The
effect of the 1976 contract on the plaintiff's rights against the defendant
could have been litigated when the bankruptcy court authorized the sale
of the trademark. The La Preferida litigation was simply a collateral
attack on the order of sale and as such, was barred by the principle
of claim preclusion.
The effect of a prior adjudication is also discussed in Bicknell v.
Stanley (In re Bicknell),77 a district court opinion authored by Judge
McKinney, which contains an interesting analysis of the relation between
state (Indiana) and federal rules of issue preclusion in dischargeability
litigation. In Bicknell, the question was whether an agreed judgment in
state court should be given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent federal
dischargeability litigation. As we have seen, the rule in the Seventh
Circuit, announced in Klingman v. Levinson, is that issue preclusion
will occur only if it is clear that the parties to the consent judgment
intended to preclude further litigation.7 8 Indiana arguably follows a
different rule, announced by the court of appeals in Hanover Logansport,
Inc. v. Robert C. Anderson, Inc. , 9 which would preclude further liti-
gation unless there was a clear intent to reserve the issue. 0 If this was
a correct characterization of the law, then it made a difference whether
the issue preclusion rule was derived from Indiana precedent or from
federal sources.
Judge McKinney first stated that the Klingman (federal) rule applied
only when the initial consent judgment settled federal litigation. 8' The
Full Faith and Credit Statute 2 required application of Indiana law in
a case such as this, when the prior adjudication occurred in state court. 83
Judge McKinney then concluded that the Indiana rule, yet to be ruled
73. 831 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987).
74. La Preferida, 914 F.2d at 906.
75. Id. at 907.
76. Id.
77. 118 B.R. 652 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
78. Id. at 654.
79. 512 N.E.2d 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
80. Bicknell, 118 B.R. at 654.
81. Id. at 658.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
83. Bicknell v. Stanley (In re Bicknell), 118 B.R. 652, 658 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
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on by the Indiana Supreme Court, would follow the federal rule, despite
the Hanover Logansport decision.8
This short summary does not do justice to Judge McKinney's me-
ticulous, detailed, and comprehensive review of Indiana and federal law.
Although almost twenty pages in length, his opinion is rewarding reading
for anyone interested in the relationship between Indiana and federal
claim and issue preclusion rules.
IV. AuToMATIc STAY
The post-bankruptcy effect of a violation of section 36285 was con-
sidered in two recent cases. In Pettibone Corp. v. Easley,16 a revested
Chapter 11 debtor sought to enjoin the continuation of a lawsuit that
had been commenced during bankruptcy in violation of the automatic
stay. Nothing in the confirmed reorganization plan prevented prosecution
of this action. Judge Easterbrook properly concluded that there no longer
was any federal interest to be advanced by enjoining the litigation.87
The effect of the completed bankruptcy proceeding upon the claimant's
right to go forward in state court was now solely a matter of state
law.88 Therefore, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to determine
the effect of the violation of the automatic stay. 9 In another decision,
Price v. Rochford,9° the court decided that an action to recover damages
84. Id. at 664-70. By concluding that the Indiana Supreme Court would adopt the
majority (Klingman) rule, Judge McKinney avoided the necessity of determining whether
the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over dischargeability proceedings required
a further holding that there was an implied exception to the full faith and credit statute.
Id. at 658-60, 670.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
86. 935 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 121.
88. Now the only obstacles to the continuation of the tort suits are the statutes
of limitations-Michigan's for two cases and Louisiana's for the third. Whether
Michigan or Louisiana would treat a case filed in violation of the automatic
stay as a non-event for limitations purposes is a question of state law. No
federal interest is in play; the bankruptcy court authorized the continued pros-
ecution of these cases when it confirmed the plan of reorganization. Federal
law assured the plaintiffs 30 days in which to pick up the baton; if states want
to give plaintiffs additional time, that is their business.
Id. This quotation suggests an interesting line of inquiry. If states are free to determine
the effect of a violation of the automatic stay on the running of the statute of limitations,
may they also attach consequences to other violations of bankruptcy policy? For example,
could a state decide that a violation of the rules against bankruptcy based discrimination
also created a cause of action under state law? Cf. Gonzales v. AM Community Credit
Union, 442 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (state law cause of action for wrongful
attempt to collect discharged debt).
89. Pettibone, 935 F.2d at 122.
90. 947 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1991).
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for a wilful violation of the automatic stay could be maintained in
federal court after dismissal of the bankruptcy case during which the
violation occurred.91
Both decisions are correct and consistent with each other. Once a
bankruptcy case is concluded, the affirmative protection provided by the
automatic stay is no longer needed. Thus, the litigation may go forward
if otherwise permissible under nonbankruptcy law. Nevertheless, the
violation of the stay may have resulted in monetary losses to the debtor
and these losses remain compensable even though the bankruptcy case
has been closed or dismissed. A footnote in Price indicates that a cause
of action arising during bankruptcy can be enforced by a post-bankruptcy
action in United States District Court. 92 This suggests that an action
alleging a post-bankruptcy violation of either section 524(a)(2) or section
525 can also be maintained in a district court action. Thus, there is no
need to reopen the bankruptcy case. 93
A third decision, Roete v. Smith (In re Roete),94 considers the
application of the automatic stay to a criminal prosecution under the
Indiana check deception statute.95 The facts in this case are quite simple.
The debtor filed for bankruptcy after giving Smith a bad check. Smith
contacted the prosecutor and was advised to present the check for
payment. Following the drawee's refusal to honor the check, Smith
signed an affidavit required by the prosecutor, and the debtor was
arrested. This action for a wilful violation of the automatic stay followed.
Bankruptcy Judge Otte awarded Smith damages of $3,189, reasoning
that a criminal prosecution instituted for debt collection purposes violates
the automatic stay, a proposition for which there is respectable lower
court authority. 96 On appeal, the judgment was reversed. The presentment
of the check was excepted from application of the stay by section
91. Id. at 831-32.
92. Id. at 832 n.l.
93. But cf. Cheripka v. Republic Ins. Co. (In re Cheripka) 122 B.R. 33 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990) (district court lacked jurisdiction to determine dischargeability prior to
a filing of petition for bankruptcy), vacated, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 898 (3d Cir. Jan.
22, 1992).
94. 936 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1991).
95. IND. CODE § 35-43-5-5 (Supp. 1991).
96. Judge Otte relied on St. Joseph Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Butler (In re Butler),
74 B.R. 106 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) and Underwood v. DeLay (In re DeLay), 48 B.R.
282 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984) (dictum). See Entry on Verified Petition for Contempt
Citation filed by Debtor, In re Roete, No. IP 88-2100J (June 12, 1989) (on file with the
Indiana Law Review). See also Hucke v. Oregon (In re Hucke), 128 B.R. 675 (D. Ore.
1991) (violation of automatic stay); Howard v. Allard, 122 B.R. 696 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (§
105 injunction against criminal prosecution for purpose of collecting debt); Bicro Corp.
v. Mackes (In re Bicro Corp.), 105 B.R. 255 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988) (§ 105 injunction
against creditor participation in bad check prosecution); In re Caldwell, 5 B.R. 740 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1980) (§ 105 injunction against creditor participation in bad check prosecution).
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362(b)(11). 97 Therefore, the court reasoned, there was no violation of
the stay.93 This conclusion ignores the fact that section 362(b)(1 1) protects
only the act of presentment, but does not immunize the entire process
of prosecution from scrutiny. The Seventh Circuit failed to explain why
the activity which preceded and followed the presentment did not amount
to an entirely independent violation of the stay. 99
Debtors should not be able to negate criminal sanctions by invoking
bankruptcy. Nonetheless, courts are entitled to look past legislative labels
and examine the substance of a proceeding or a statute.'0° Today, the
identification of a true criminal proceeding may be difficult because the
demarcation between criminal and civil laws is not as clear as it was
fifty years ago. Restitution is now recognized as an element of criminal
justice.' 0 ' Nevertheless, the compensatory aspect of a criminal remedy
can support the inference that it is a private pecuniary interest, rather
than the public interest, which is being protected through a prosecution.
If the protection of private pecuniary interest predominates, then bank-
ruptcy should abate the pseudocriminal prosecution. 02 To date, this
argument has not been persuasive. Debtors have been completely un-
successful in convincing circuit courts that intervention to protect their
interests is either necessary or appropriate. 0 3 In one sense then, the
97. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11) (1988).
98. Roete, 936 F.2d at 966.
99. Roete argued that § 362(b)(11) did not apply because he had been harassed.
The court refused to consider this argument because "[t]he transcript ... contains no
evidence of harassment." Id. at 966 n.5. There is no explanation of why the second
contact with the prosecutor did not support a finding of harassment. Roete's pleading in
the bankruptcy court clearly included the contact with the prosecutor in his charge of
harassment. See Verified Petition for Contempt Citation, In re Roete, No. IP 88-2100J
(March 22, 1989) (on file with the Indiana Law Review).
100. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982), the Supreme Court held that Congress's attempt to pass jurisdiction through
the district court to the bankruptcy court in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 violated Article III of the
Constitution because "it impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes
of the judicial power from the Article III district court, and has vested those attributes
in a non-Article III adjunct." Id. at 87.
101. See Huggett v. State, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1978). See also Katherine
A. Francis, Note, Dischargeability of Criminal Restitution Obligations Under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1349, 1369-71 (1991).
102. The Eleventh Circuit recently indicated doubt that the Alabama bad check
statute provides for criminal sanctions. Reynolds v. Dixie Nissan (In re Car Renovators),
946 F.2d 780, 783 n.6 (lth Cir. 1991).
103. Fussell v. Price (In re Fussell), 928 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusal to enjoin
prosecution for criminal conversion); United States v. Caddell, 830 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1987)
(refusal to enjoin revocation of probation); Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176
(3d Cir. 1982) (refusal to enjoin bad check prosecution); Barnette v. Evans, 673 F.2d
1250 (11th Cir. 1982) (refusal to enjoin prosecution which might result in restitution
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result in Roete is consistent with existing authority and is unsurprising.
Yet, a strong argument can also be made that in Roete, the failure to
intervene and find a violation of the automatic stay was a serious mistake.
First of all, the potential interference with prosecutorial discretion, a
major concern in this area, was negligible. The prosecutor was well
aware of the check deception event prior to bankruptcy and had, ap-
parently, decided not to prosecute. It took a second complaint, after
bankruptcy had begun, to arouse his interest. More importantly, it is
difficult to characterize the Indiana check deception statute as anything
other than a glorified collection remedy. 104 Even though the penalty for
violation is a misdemeanor, 10 5 payment of a dishonored check within
ten days is a complete defense to prosecution.1°s The prosecutor is denied
the discretion to proceed after payment even if he believes that a
prosecution would be in the public interest.
Because direct challenges to pseudocriminal prosecutions have been
mainly unsuccessful, it may be worthwhile for debtor counsel to consider
alternative approaches which eliminate incentives to invoke the criminal
process by depriving creditors of restitution gains. One possibility is to
seek an injunction which prevents the creditor from accepting payment
which is made to bar a criminal prosecution.1°7 Another possibility is
to persuade the bankruptcy trustee to avoid such a payment under section
547.108 Recently, the Eleventh Circuit held that a payment made to avoid
a possible bad check prosecution was an avoidable preference.' °9 Sug-
gesting avoidance is a risky strategy, however, because avoidance of the
restitution payment may result in a renewal of the criminal prosecution.
V. DEBTOR B ErNrs: DIScHARGE
Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge certain familial obligations,
but only if they are owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
order); United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982) (restitution order is ap-
propriate).
104. For a general criticism of bad check statues, see Steven Kratsch & William E.
Young, Criminal Prosecutions and Manipulative Restitution: The Use of State Criminal
Courts for Contravention of Debtor Relief, 1984 ANNuAL SURvEY oF BAsRr. L. 107;
Josephine R. Potuto, And Mussolini Had the Trains Running on Time: A Review of the
Bad Check Offense and the Law Enforcement Debt Collector, 65 NEB. L. REv. 242 (1986).
105. IND. CODE § 35-43-5-5(a) (Supp. 1991).
106. Id. § 35-43-5-5(e).
107. See Holder v. Dotson (In re Holder), 26 B.R. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982)
(debtor was denied permanent injunction enjoining prosecution for bad checks, but the
court noted that the creditor was prohibited from accepting restitution as a result of the
prosecution).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
109. Reynolds v. Dixie Nissan (In re Car Renovators), 946 F.2d 780, 782-83 (11th
Cir. 1991) (president of debtor-corporation, seeking to avoid criminal prosecution, causes
debtor to make restitution).
[Vol. 25:981
BANKRUPTCY
debtor."" 0 Two years ago, the Seventh Circuit held that attorney's fees
incurred by a mother in connection with paternity litigation did not fall
within this exception because she was neither a spouse nor former
spouse."' At that time the court stated:
The cases which deny discharge for attorneys' fees incurred to
obtain child support assimilate the debt owed the attorney to a
debt owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor."
The theory is that the spouse's or child's expenses of collection
are part of the underlying obligation. That theory cannot stretch
to cover fees for an attorney hired by the debtor, unless there
is some legal obligation to hire an attorney on behalf of the
spouse or child. [Creditor] has admitted that [debtor] had no
legal obligation to pursue a support order at all. [Debtor] was
merely seeking financial relief in meeting her own support burden.
[Debtor's] contract with [creditor] did not generate a debt to
[debtor's] child. It follows that [debtor's] obligation to [creditor]
was not in the nature of child support."2
Now the court has taken an apparently inconsistent position in
holding that a mother's pregnancy and confinement expenses are not
dischargeable because they are part of a support obligation owed to the
child."' This time the court reasoned:
[B]ut for the pregnancy, Deanne would not have incurred medical
and confinement expenses associated with baby Derek's birth.
These medical services, although performed upon the mother,
necessarily and directly benefit the child as well.
... A father should not be allowed to avoid liability for
the mother's medical care arising from the birth of their child
merely because the parents did not marry until after their child
was born or did not marry at all." 4
This latest reasoning would also support a finding of nondischarge-
ability with reference to the attorney's fees incurred in an attempt to
establish paternity. The definitive opinion on this subject remains to be
written.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
111. In re Rios, 901 F.2d 71, 72 (7th Cir. 1990).
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. In re Seibert, 914 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir. 1990).
114. Id. at 106-07.
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